

SPEECH BY ROBERT E. MATTESON, DIRECTOR OF THE WHITE HOUSE DISARMAMENT STAFF,
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The Disarmament Dilemma

I.

The most agonizing and frustrating dilemma of our time is that while the Russian people and the American people earnestly desire peace, the governments of these countries find it necessary to prepare feverishly for the eventuality of war. While neither the Soviet nor the US government wants an all-out nuclear war, the fact is that each of them is engaging in an arms race which lends itself less and less to control by human intelligence and which many informed observers believe may lead only to war.

One of these informed observers is Secretary Dulles and in his book War or Peace first published in 1950 he gave this view of the future: "An armaments race is in full swing, and United Nations efforts to check that race have so far proved fruitless. Communists have always assumed that Communism and Capitalism would become locked in a death struggle. Many people in the United States are today making that same assumption. That in turn makes war more likely and impels political leaders more and more to be guided by military judgments about winning a future war rather than by political judgments about winning peace. All of that makes for increasing tension and ultimate explosion. If history is any guide, war will come out of this situation. There should be no illusion about the reality of the danger. It is immense. Future generations will look back with amazement if war is averted".

And this was 8 years ago -- before the beginning of the spread of nuclear weapons; before the megaton thermo-nuclear bombs; before the intermediate range ballistic missiles; before the successful flight testing of the inter-continental ballistic missiles; before the nuclear-powered submarines; and before the development of earth satellites. The day is not too far off when these IRBMs and ICBMs capable of speeds up to 18,000 miles an hour will be aimed in on the vital centers of American life.

The same will, of course, be true with respect to the vital centers of the Soviet Union and herein lies the compulsive drive for the arms race. Each side can ill afford to stop the costly, dangerous developments of modern armaments for fear that one side will then be at the mercy of the other. The contradiction is that we must go on devising new weapons in order to make negotiable the stopping of their production. Until now, an uneasy peace has been

preserved by this mutual deterrent, or by what Sir Winston Churchill has called this "balance of terror". But how long will the world be spared from all-out nuclear war, once nuclear weapons have spread into the hands of irresponsible dictators in many small countries; once the air, the oceans, and the earth are dotted with vehicles carrying megaton nuclear missiles; and once a local commander or even an electrical computing machine might, under these circumstances, so easily trip the wire that sets off the general nuclear holocaust?

This is not a pleasant prospect -- and it is time that America woke up to it. The indications are that the Russians are awake to it and with a singleness of purpose, with determined confidence, and with an unexpected ability are driving ahead relentlessly in the present, so-called "peaceful competition" to make sure that the funeral dirge - about which Lenin spoke - will be sung over the free world society rather than over the Communist society.

II.

As Lester Pearson said here at the University of Minnesota 3 months ago when he delivered the Gideon Seymour Memorial Lecture - the central political fact of our time is that the totalitarian empire of Russia and the mighty democracy of America are today brought face to face on the firing line for the first time. For the first time in its history, all of the United States - its cities, its people, its homes, its schools, its farms, and its factories - are face to face with the Soviet military might. For the first time in its history, the United States is literally a front line nation facing a striking power so great that, without adequate defense and counter force, the entire US could be completely devastated in the space of 12 hours in one gigantic nuclear attack.

People are naturally inclined not to want to believe or face up to such unpleasant possibilities and, therefore, it is of the greatest importance that repeated efforts be made to get the American people to understand and appreciate the danger under which we are now all living.

Let me re-state a few facts about the revolution in nuclear weapons which some, if not most of you, undoubtedly have listened to before. These are stated not to shock people but to help remove the complacency and self-satisfaction that too often exists regarding our every-day lives - to make people not only aware of the reality of danger but also of the effort needed and the sacrifice required if America is to survive in a free world.

During all of the 6 years of the most destructive war people have yet known - World War II - the total aggregate of high explosives dropped by all sides in all theatres of operation was less than is capable of being contained today in one single nuclear bomb. This revolutionary increase in the development of the destructive power of bombs is illustrated by the following progression: A "block buster" bomb carried by the B-29s at the end of World War II had about 2½ tons of TNT and as the name implies could destroy a city block.

The Hiroshima bomb in 1945 had the equivalent of 20,000 tons of TNT and could destroy a small city. This "city buster" represented an increase in explosive power of 8,000 times over the World War II "block buster". But this 20,000 ton bomb (or 20 kiloton bomb as it is now called) dropped on Hiroshima - which caused 140,000 casualties and devastated an area of 5 square miles - is small by comparison with the thousand times more powerful 20 million ton (or 20 megaton) bomb capability of today. And the fact is there is no theoretical upper limit to the explosive power that can be developed.

Added to this, the speed of delivery of such weapons has jumped from 300 miles per hour in World War II to 18,000 miles per hour in the missile age. A missile would travel the 4,000 miles from Soviet Siberia to Minneapolis in less than 20 minutes. It could reach any target in the United States in 30 minutes and could reach all US overseas bases in less time than that. If a Russian bomber were to drop one 20 megaton nuclear bomb on the Twin Cities tonight, there would be a radius of total destruction of 5 miles. The bomb crater itself would be a mile and a half across and 250 feet deep. There would be heavy destruction for a radius of another 5 miles, moderate damage for a third 5 miles, and light damage in the radius of the fourth 5 miles. Seventy-five per cent of the people within a radius of 5 miles from the explosion of the bomb would be killed immediately by blast, heat, and radiation. Others of those who would survive the first day would die later from burns or from radiation sickness. The area covered by radioactive fallout - if the fireball of the weapon touches the ground and sucks up earth particles - could contaminate an area around the Twin Cities greater than the State of Minnesota.

However, because it is possible that some defense can be built against these missiles and against manned bomber attacks, perhaps the greatest threat of all may be the nuclear-powered, missile-launching submarine which in a few years will be able to fire high-yield nuclear missiles from submerged positions and which can travel at relatively high speeds submerged without refueling for weeks at a time. Such a nuclear-powered submarine equipped with solid-fuel, high-yield nuclear missiles has the tremendous advantage of not only being mobile but out of sight. The three oceans - the Arctic, Pacific, and Atlantic - which traditionally have been America's greatest protection - now are in the process of becoming the avenues for its greatest threat. From submarines in the Gulf of Mexico and off of both of our coasts, most of the United States can be blanketed by nuclear bombardment. But what makes this revolution in weapons systems truly ominous is that it is in the hands of a fanatical, competent, Communist leadership dedicated to the proposition that in the end Communism will rule the world -- and which would use their military power as the base for accomplishing world domination by infiltration, subversion, and negotiation -- under the cover of "peaceful coexistence".

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III.

During the past 11 years I have had the opportunity of talking to many Russians not only in the Soviet Union but in England, and in the United States. I was fortunate to be able to sit in on the long conference that Mr. Stassen had with Generalissimo Stalin on a winter night in 1947 in the Kremlin and that same year sat in on the conferences with Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Voznessensky, Zhdanov and Molotov. We visited Russian peasants in their cottages and on their collective farms in the Ukraine, and Russian workers in their living quarters in western Siberia and in their factories in Sverdlovsk, Stalingrad, Moscow, Kiev, and Leningrad. Particularly during the last two years, we have had -- through the disarmament negotiations in London and in New York -- an exceptional opportunity to observe their methods and their personalities at close range. For example, there was the 2½ hour conference we had with Khrushchev at Claridge's in London in April 1956. There have been a great many bilateral conversations with members of the Soviet Delegations in London and at the United Nations carried on with the knowledge and consent of our Western partners. Likewise, I have read the reports of others on Russia and have talked with or listened to many of our experts on the Soviet Union, including our Ambassadors.

From all of these experiences and information, I have the following personal impressions:

First, the most surprising thing about the Soviet Union is how little their people resemble their government and how much more like us they are. Yet, because they are fed constantly only the Communist creed, most of them are favorable to their government and believe only what they are told.

Second, I believe there is today in Russia great pressure from the Russian people on the leaders of the Soviet Communist Party and government for peace and for agreement with the United States.

Third, the Soviet Communists (in number they equal about 3% of the population) are supremely confident that Communism will in the end triumph in the world, and it is unmistakably evident that they will do everything in their power short of general war to see to it that it does triumph.

Fourth, the Soviet leadership would like to negotiate an agreement with the United States primarily for the purpose of relaxing tension.

Fifth, the area of greatest interest to the Soviet Union for such an agreement appears to be in the disarmament field.

Sixth, Russia suffers from a real feeling of inferiority and this is a key to many of their attitudes, for example, their great desire to be accepted as an equal power and, to some extent, their insistence on a recognition by the West of the status quo.

Seventh, the Soviet Union is a powerful nation and is not likely to collapse either from external pressure or from internal difficulties. The evidence thus far is that even the shifts in leadership at the top seem to have resulted in greater strength rather than in greater weakness.

Eighth, and possibly the most important of all, there is increasing evidence that the Soviet under the right circumstances will gradually evolve toward greater and greater freedom, both with respect to its internal domestic relations and also in respect to its relations with the outside world.

This favorable prospect for gradual evolution appears to be the result of: the death of Stalin and the emergence of a somewhat different type of

leadership; a greater sense of security resulting from the Soviet nuclear-missile-satellite developments; the spread of education; the improved standard of living; increasing contacts, by one method or another, of an increasing number of Russians with the free world; the rise in the lower echelons of Government of more open-minded, less dogmatic leaders, the fact that the urge for freedom cannot be rooted out either by force or by fraud; and, not the least, the fact that the Russian people, on the whole, are human beings with human reactions. For the most part, the Russian people, as I have found them, are friendly, warm hearted, and generous people. In saying this, I realize it goes against a stereotype that has been built up by some of our newspapers, leaders, and even educators. But it is a fact that until some of our misconceptions about them are corrected - as well as their misconceptions about us - there will not be a sound basis for improved relations between us. In this regard, it is possible that the road from the grey world to the white world may, at this particular time, more easily be traversed by way of expanding East-West contacts, particularly the exchange of personal visits at all levels, than by any other procedure. For this reason the Exchange Agreement with Russia signed three weeks ago could prove to be a significant beginning.

Above everything else, the Russian leaders are confident that time is on their side; that the dialectic of history will move the people of the world inexorably, scientifically toward acceptance of a Communist world. The one thing they seem to fear is that a minor incident, a miscalculation, or the contradictions of "the imperialist, capitalist system" will set off a general war that will devastate the world - including, of course, themselves. Therefore, the Soviet leadership sees it in their interest to avoid a general nuclear war, to stress peaceful coexistence and competition, and to seek and use every opportunity at hand - whether it be disarmament negotiations, the Brussels Fair, a chess match, a Summit conference, student exchanges, or even a private dinner conversation - to advance the ball toward the goal of world Communism. To the Communist the end justifies the means and he will, with skill and determination, use any means to achieve this goal. At the same time, he is recognizing that technology is imposing its own changes on Communist doctrine by fixing limits to the means which can be safely used to achieve its ends.

However, there is hope in all of this for it is bringing Khrushchev and the Soviet people out from behind their Iron Curtain at the same time that

it is permitting some relaxation on the movement of people and information from the free world into the Soviet Bloc territory. To an increasing extent, the Soviet intelligentsia - the writers, the scientists, the younger leaders - are beginning to see and reflect the first direct rays of sunlight - rather than viewing through Stalin spectacles the distorted shadows on their cold prison walls. To an increasing extent, the Soviet mind - twisted and frozen into an iron mould - is beginning to thaw. And it is the scientists, I believe, who are leading the way. For if they are to be effective in their contribution to the Soviet military might, they must be permitted to seek out the truth, wherever it is. When science and Communist doctrine are in conflict, the present Soviet leaders have allowed science to win. To an increasing extent, therefore, through the cracks and crevices of the Iron Curtain, the winds of freedom are beginning to penetrate.

If we have confidence in our system, if we are wise and vigilant in our policies and actions, we should welcome and encourage this change from the Stalin period as an opportunity to evolve the Soviet system toward freedom - rather than, as we too often do, view it more as something to be feared and as a threat to the very existence of the free world. If we have no confidence in ourselves and in our system, we had better start digging holes in the ground, evacuating our cities, putting our children in subterranean vaults, and wearing asbestos and decontamination suits.

IV.

The central question of our time, stripped of all its masks, is whether the free world is capable of successfully competing with the Communist world for the very existence of a free world. Stated in another way, this question is whether or not the authoritarian Soviet system gives the Communist world such great advantages in terms of decision making, of being able to concentrate resources on certain programs and areas, of using any kind of immoral methods short of war to subvert free governments, that the free world cannot allow itself to enter into such a one-sided competition if it wishes to survive.

If one's answer to this question of competition is that the free world has the capability of competing successfully with the Communist world despite those advantages which the Communist world has in such competition,

the general policy adopted toward Russia would be one of permitting and encouraging Communism to come out from behind the Iron Curtain and of gradually opening and exposing the Communist world to freedom. Such a policy would derive from a confidence that we have in our free institutions and way of life to meet and defeat Communism in any kind of competition. Such a policy would advocate the maintenance of relatively great military and economic strength but, at the same time, would pursue a course of gradually relaxing tension, of increased contacts with the Russians, of increased trade, of gradual and reciprocal safeguarded arms limitation and control, and of the willingness to carry out negotiations with the Communists based on a true mutuality of interest.

On the other hand, if one's answer to this question is that the free world stands a poor chance of competing successfully with the Communist world because of the various advantages the Communist world has in any such competition - then the general policy adopted toward Russia would be one of bottling up Communists and Communism within its present Iron Curtain area and seeking by outside pressures and inside subversion to so disrupt and weaken the Communist regime that it would fall from within - and thus prevent Communism from flowing out to contaminate and subvert the free world. Such a policy would put heavy emphasis on increasing the strength of the military alliances - such as NATO, Baghdad, SEATO - and on placing nuclear units around the border of the Soviet Bloc. It would restrict to a minimum contacts of American and free world people with Soviet Communists. It would put a heavy secrecy label on information to scientists and the American people in general. And it would frown on serious negotiation with the Communists.

In summary, the first, or "relaxation of tension," policy is one which would recognize the strength of the Soviet Bloc and would do more to encourage the liberalizing tendencies within the Bloc. It would accept the Soviet as an equal power and would encourage the gradual evolution of the Soviet system toward freedom.

The second, or "increased pressure," policy, on the other hand, is one which would emphasize more the weakness of the Soviet Bloc, would look toward pressuring the Soviet leadership into agreements which represent concessions by the Soviets to their own interest, and would look toward striving to pressure the Soviet system into a collapse without a war.

Such a statement of alternative policies represents a necessary oversimplification of two opposing conceptions. The fact is, of course, that these policies cannot be painted in black and white terms - that there are in practice in the policies of free governments elements of each. But it is true that today in Washington and in the other free world capitals, there exists in the policy formulation process within governments a day-to-day competition between the major emphases of these two different concepts. One cannot be dogmatic and wise enough to know that one or the other is right, but it is my belief that we may very well be at one of those great historical divides where a boldness in exploration of the "relaxation of tension" concept might pay greater dividends than we now suspect for the future of world peace.

V.

The background which I have given you is the context within which I believe the six months London disarmament talks of 1957 should be viewed. This background can be summarized in the following syllogism:

(a) A disarmament agreement in the mutual interest of the US and USSR is possible primarily because both the US and the Soviet agree that the chances are that the present arms race can end only in an all-out nuclear war which neither of them wants.

(b) It is in the US interest to pursue a policy - which while maintaining a posture of great relative strength - relaxes tension and encourages the evolution of the Soviet system toward freedom primarily because to increase tension by unduly increasing pressure on the Soviet Bloc in the hope it will surrender or collapse may more likely result in violent Soviet reactions which would make war itself more likely.

(c) Therefore, - and this is the principal conclusion on which Mr. Stassen based the negotiations at London - US policy should be to actively and seriously seek a first step disarmament agreement which, if properly implemented, would relax tension; enhance the prospects of halting and then reversing the arms race; improve the climate for major political settlements; and encourage the evolution of the Soviet system toward freedom.

Any first step agreement, as we in London saw it - to be "properly implemented" - should be based on these essential principles and safeguards:

(1) The security of the United States should not depend in any disarmament agreement on the good faith of the other country; rather it should put its reliance on an effective system of inspection.

(2) The United States should not agree to or implement a greater relative reduction in its total military power than the Soviet Union.

(3) In the existing state of scientific knowledge, the United States should not agree to the elimination of nuclear weapons, for the simple reason that it is not possible by any known scientific or other means to account for the total previous production of nuclear weapons material.

(4) A renunciation clause should be made part of the agreement so that no country would be locked into an agreement. In other words, it is assumed that any agreement will be effective only so long as it continues to work to the interest of each country.

(5) The minimum objective of the first step agreement - if the possibility of agreement is to be maximized - should not be radical disarmament measures but should be a relaxation of tension and reduction of danger of war without appreciably altering the power position of the US and USSR. The maximum objective of a such first step would be to bring down below the "annihilation level" the military capability of each country.

(6) The problem of controlling nuclear weapons will be complicated greatly, if not made impossible, once nuclear weapons spread to fourth countries.

(7) Because of the imminent development and deployment of missiles of intermediate and intercontinental range and the greater difficulty at a later date of detecting hidden missile installations and nuclear powered submarines, it is important to try to reach an agreement soon on the control of outer space for peaceful purposes.

While agreement on the first step in disarmament was not reached in London, significant accomplishments were nevertheless achieved in the face of almost overwhelming difficulties. Secretary Dulles in his August 6th press conference stated his opinion in referring to the Western proposals put forward on August 2nd: "I believe that the proposals made on behalf of the Four Western Powers last week ... represent perhaps the most significant proposal in terms of peace that I think has been made in recent history, perhaps ever." And on September 10th at his press conference after the close of the London talks, Secretary Dulles said: "I think it is an over-statement to say that they (the London negotiations) have failed. I believe that more progress toward disarmament has been made at these talks than has ever been made before in the long history of efforts toward disarmament ... the achievement now is really quite monumental in comparison with the total inability ... of the (World War I) allies to come to agreement among themselves."

Perhaps the most significant achievement during the London negotiations was that by probing Soviet intentions in informal sessions, the basic negotiating assumption was confirmed - namely, that the Soviet government needed, wanted, and might agree to some kind of a limited first step agreement. The areas of agreement and disagreement had become so clearly defined by June of last year that a little more movement by either side could have resulted in an agreement in the interest of both sides.

A second principal achievement was the beginning of a relaxation of tension in the first few months of the negotiation brought about by the seriousness shown on both sides. President Eisenhower's press conference statements in May and June were of particular assistance in achieving this negotiating atmosphere and in achieving the beginning of a relaxation which may well have contributed to the removal from the Soviet leadership in June of the most extreme Stalinists.

A third achievement of the London talks was the education of the press, people, and key governments of the world to the nature and importance of the disarmament subject. This was done by background press briefings, by the work of the USIA, and by effective liaison with the Embassies of many countries represented in London.

A fourth achievement - but which may have had some important negative aspects in terms of making more difficult an agreement with the Soviet Union - was the most successful use of the NATO consultation machinery in the history of NATO.

A fifth achievement was the salutary effect of the US position and the US conduct at the London talks on the so-called uncommitted, neutralist, and undeveloped countries of the world - particularly in Asia. This was evidenced among other ways by public opinion polls in the Asiatic areas which showed that any significant margins the feeling was that the US, at that time, was doing more for peace in the disarmament area than the Soviet Union.

A sixth achievement was the effect the negotiations had on the Soviet people. It is known that the Soviet people because of the length and seriousness of the negotiations, the substance of those US statements and positions which they were given either by their own media or by free world media, and the interest of the President in the issue were, at least during the first half of the negotiations, impressed by this evidence of the US desire for peace.

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Finally, there were the substantive achievements which while short of the goal of agreement did - on the basis of the US proposals - result in complete Western agreement and did narrow significantly the gap between the Soviet and Western positions. (Among these were indications of agreement by the West and the Soviet to the following: three stage force levels of 2.5, 2.1, and 1.7 million men for the US and USSR, but without agreement to the conditions for transition from one level to the other; agreement to partial rather than comprehensive proposals; agreement to the principle of submission of specific lists of major designated armaments to be reduced; agreement on inspected verification of two to three year nuclear test suspension; and agreement to the principle of aerial inspection zones in Europe and in the Siberian-North American area.) The difficulty was, however, that each of these items was agreed to only in the context of other proposals or conditions. Neither side was ever able to move quite far enough to meet the minimum conditions of the other side.

VI.

Finally, a word regarding where we are now and what the future prospects of disarmament negotiations seem to be. As you no doubt are aware, there is at the present time both a procedural impasse as well as a substantive impasse. After the close of the UN Subcommittee talks in London in September, the Soviet made it clear last November 14th that they would not return to the Subcommittee or to the Disarmament Commission so long as both of these bodies were so constituted as to leave the Soviet side with unequal representation. In the Subcommittee, the Soviets pointed out there were four NATO powers on one side and only the Soviet Union on the other. Regarding the Disarmament Commission, the Soviets made similar charges. Therefore, during the UNGA sessions last Fall, as a move to meet the Soviet position, the Western nations put forward a resolution to enlarge the Disarmament Commission (which had been composed of 11 Security Council members, plus Canada) from 12 nations to 25 nations. The Soviets on their side had at first requested a permanent 82 nation Commission or a Commission of all of the nations in the United Nations, on the basis that all nations had a vital interest in disarmament. This was defeated by a vote of 47 to 9 with 24 abstentions. When the West and a number of neutral nations countered with the 25 nation proposal, the Soviet Union through Albania put forward a 32 nation proposal which they maintained would provide for equitable representation. The Albanian suggestion was voted down 38 to 19 with 19 abstentions and the 25 nation group was then approved 60 to 9 with 11 abstentions. The 25 nation Disarmament Commission, as agreed to now, consists of the eleven members of the Security Council for 1958, plus the 14 newly added members. Of these 25 members, 16 are associated in military pacts with the United States, the 9 others being neutral or allied with the Soviet bloc.

The Soviet Union has indicated it would not come into the 25 nation Disarmament Commission, stating that its composition is still too heavily weighted against them. Consequently, up to now there have been no meetings called of the new Disarmament Commission. However, it is my belief that, because of the great pressures to do so, before very long the Soviet Union, the United States, and the other great powers will agree to come together under some umbrella to discuss, first, the procedures and, then, the substance of disarmament. Likewise, the prospect is bright for a Summit meeting, if adequately prepared for, at which disarmament would probably be the major topic.

On the substantive side, the prospects are less clear. The Soviet Union has both its package proposals and also certain first steps which it says it would be willing to take in isolation from the package. The United States and the Western partners have their own variety of package proposals which were submitted to the Soviet Union in London on August 29th and on which they still stand. The recent Eisenhower-Bulganin exchanges of letters have not altered the substantive situation as it stood at the close of the London talks on September 6th.

The subjects which I believe may hold the greatest hope for agreement and which might be concentrated on in future negotiations are these: a two year verified suspension of nuclear tests; European and Bering Straits inspection zones; a verified cessation of production of nuclear weapons; and control of outer space for peaceful purposes. The Soviet Union has shown more of an interest in the first two than the West has and the West has shown more of an interest in the last two than the Soviets have. However, both sides have shown some interest in each of these areas.

What makes the prospects for a disarmament agreement hopeful is that both the leaders of the Soviet Union and of the United States have emphasized the tremendous importance they attach to such an agreement. President Eisenhower in his State of the Union message on January 9, 1958 stated: "In the last analysis, there is only one solution to the grim problems that lie ahead. The world must stop the present plunge toward more and more destructive weapons of war, and turn the corner that will start our steps firmly on the path toward lasting peace ... of all the works of peace, none is more needed now than a real first step toward disarmament."

In closing, let me pay a word of tribute to two fellow Minnesotans - Senator Hubert Humphrey and Governor Harold Stassen - who though they are outstanding leaders of different political parties have cooperated effectively in a non-partisan way to advance the best interests of the country in this tremendously important subject of disarmament. Under Senator Humphrey's leadership, the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Disarmament has by its hearings, its staff studies, and its reports made an extremely important contribution to the greater understanding of this complicated subject by the Congress, the press, and public opinion. Mr. Stassen's contribution has been in being the spearhead in the development within the Administration of a new US position on disarmament; and then in brilliantly carrying forward in London one of the most complicated, frustrating negotiating assignments ever entrusted to an American diplomat. The fact that he was not successful in reaching an agreement in London has put into the shadow the outstanding job that he did there.

As Roscoe Drummond - one of the most respected and objective of correspondents - said in reporting from London in the New York Herald-Tribune at the close of the London talks: "I have talked with the professionals in three capitals who sat with him (Mr. Stassen) and worked with him during the weary, frustrating months of the London talks, and their judgment is unanimous: That, with the possible exception of General Alfred Gruenther, who negotiated the four-power Austrian military agreement, Mr. Stassen proved abler than any American official in dealing with the Soviets; that among all the Allied participants in London, Mr. Stassen proved himself pre-eminent in being able to sit out the Russians and to keep from being goaded into anger or being trapped into petty polemics; that his distinctive contribution was to keep his part

of the discussions constantly constructive, at a high level of earnestness and never to be drawn off into minor debating points." Mr. Drummond further reported: "I am not suggesting that Mr. Stassen can get a disarmament agreement out of the Russians if they do not want one. But I am reporting that in the view of those closest to the London talks, Mr. Stassen has outstanding capabilities as a negotiator with the Soviets, and that when and if Moscow is ever ready to talk business, Mr. Stassen is one who can help make sure we get the best, fool-proof agreement."

Not only is such effective cooperation needed between the leaders of political parties but even more it is needed between governments if the governments are to be truly responsive to the needs of today. For today's developments in science and technology tend to make obsolete not only today's military weapons but today's foreign policies and, fortunately, even Communist doctrine. What was good for 1950 or even for August 1957 is not necessarily good for today. The past history of man's inhumanity to man bears witness to his tragic failures in this regard.

In the last 500 years covering the period of modern world history, there have been 300 wars, or 3 wars every 5 years. In the 20th century alone, there have been 28 wars in 58 years and of these there were two World Wars in the space of just 25 years. The 20th century has, until now, been called "the Century of Total War", but, if such a war should occur, only Toynbee's pygmies and eskimos may be left to describe it more appropriately as "the century of total destruction."

Unlike those who predict the inevitability of all-out nuclear war and the destruction of civilization, or those who forecast the decline of America to a second class power, I firmly believe that the United States under the leadership of President Eisenhower has the heritage, the courage, the conviction, the resources, and the wisdom not only to prevent an all-out nuclear war, but to go on and win out in the tough and fateful competition for a free world which lies ahead. I further believe that a sound start can be made in solving the dilemma to which I referred at the very beginning of these remarks (i.e. people wanting peace but their governments all the time needing to prepare more destructive weapons of war) by taking steps now to carry out the injunction which President Eisenhower so emphatically and so wisely laid down in his State of the Union message on January 9th when he said: "Of all the works of peace, none is more needed now than a real first step toward disarmament." I believe that the seeds planted in the London talks may bear fruit in 1958 and that the real, first step toward disarmament will be taken.

But more important even than this is that we as a people look beyond and think beyond our present necessary security arrangements into new fields of human relationship with the rest of the peoples of the world. We cannot keep reducing the size of our planet and increasing the population on it without accepting also the necessity of getting along with other people, languages, and cultures about which too many of us now have massive ignorance.

Unless we move out from behind our TV sets and our trenches of luxurious living and readapt our lives and our thinking to a new kind of competition - we are sure to be ambushed like Athens, Rome and Carthage before us. If

democracy is to win out, the American people themselves must, as this Conference is doing, take new initiatives in community and international programs - and not be content with looking to Washington for all of the answers. We must lead not only from strength but from wisdom and confidence and not continue to equate contact with Russians with contamination by Russians, or negotiation with Russians with appeasement of Russians.

The advent of Sputnik and Explorer marks a new age - and no sounder advice can be given than that of the man whose birthday we commemorate about this time every year, when at the beginning of another new age one hundred years ago he, Abraham Lincoln, said:

" ... the dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulties, and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so must we think and act anew."